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Security Information

Official Diary

Wednesday, 15 October 1952

1. At the Deputies' meeting, briefly reviewed for DCI the various policy and intelligence developments relating to Iran. I touched upon the activities of various groups within the oil industry and relayed Mr. Amory's report that certain independents who had been active in the Mexican situation were anxious to play a part with respect to Iranian oil. I indicated that Mr. Amory would be glad to elaborate, upon request.

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2. Expressed to [REDACTED] my appreciation for their willingness to detail [REDACTED] to O/CI as Chief of Security. I felt that this was a most important post.

3. Spoke to the DCI about having General Shortt leave the IAC so that we could discuss certain sensitive estimates and he suggested, instead, that we trim the agenda so as to have General Shortt present throughout the entire session. I thereafter consulted with Generals Partridge and Ackerman, and Admiral Stout and Mr. Armstrong, and it was agreed that we would limit the agenda to the Albanian and South African papers.

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4. Checked with [REDACTED] his proposal to advise Admiral Overesch that the matter of re-location of the [REDACTED] was being dealt with in Washington and felt action should be deferred until Washington negotiations were firmed up. We would inform DCI of our recommendations before dispatching such a cable.

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5. Requested Mr. Wisner to have his representative at the [REDACTED] meeting brief me on the progress of the conference and he undertook to do so.

6. Cleared with DCI the plan of Mr. Gleason to put the summary evaluation paper on an early NSC agenda, without special priority treatment. Mr. Gleason felt it was important that the President be present at the meeting when this paper was discussed. DCI approved our plan. Later Mr. Gleason informed me that they had received the ICIS suggestions for amendments and I arranged with Mr. Hoover to have him review them, clear the amendments with General Samford and then substitute the same for corresponding portions of the existing paper. We felt that this would be preferable to having two separate papers. Mr. Gleason concurred in this view and I informed Mr. Whearty of the ICIS of our plan and he also approved of it. When the amendments have been cleared by Samford and Hoover, I shall secure DCI's approval of this procedure.

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7. At the Deputies' meeting, DCI instructed Mr. Wisner to request Admiral Overesch and General Truscott to indicate the names of personnel who would be released for reassignment if current plans for reduction of force were to be accomplished. I am requesting [REDACTED] to alert the various Intelligence Offices that personnel will become available from overseas on reassignment and called [REDACTED] in order to indicate to him our interest. [REDACTED] informed me that the names of surplus personnel will be given to [REDACTED] who in turn will contact other Agency units.

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8. At the request of Sherman Kent, discussed SIE-5 with [REDACTED] of O/NE and indicated to him that I was satisfied, in view of the existing circumstances, not to request any changes in the paper as presently drafted. An attempt to make changes at this time might reopen on any disputed points. I made it clear, however, that I did not feel that this paper had finally solved the problem of how to express our estimates of Soviet scientific capabilities. I was particularly dissatisfied by the necessity of having so many estimates of capability to create a capability, which was a relatively meaningless term, even expressed in terms of potential, which was so open-ended as to leave the policy-maker without much guidance. Nevertheless, I had to recognize the inadequacy of our information. Actually, some of the Military or OB estimates are a little better than potentiality estimates, but a distinct effort should be made to apprise consumers of the distinction between a direct estimate of a capability and an estimate of potential, which was only indirectly, if at all, a judgment as to a capability.

AD/NE

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9. Phoned [REDACTED] of PY staff and suggested that I would be glad to talk with him at any time on my suggestion to Frank Wisner that they develop a glossary of political terms as used by the Soviets. He will call next week for an appointment.

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10. Phoned [REDACTED] and received a report on the [REDACTED] matter. Developments appear to be favorable.

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11. [REDACTED] expressed concern that the current slash in personnel for [REDACTED] might be applied to units having a particular interest for Intelligence Offices without sufficient consideration being given to the impact upon substantive intelligence interests. I agreed with this point of view and suggested that Mr. Reber coordinate the views of the Intelligence Offices on this point covering particularly O/SI, O/RR, O/CI and O/CD (microfilm). After we have such a study, I shall take it up with Mr. Wisner and with the Director.

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12. [REDACTED] phoned and stated that PSB was concerned on the possibility of a "change of pace on the part of the Soviets" and requested authority to speak with Dr. Kent and with Mr. Sheldon and some of their people. I suggested that he talk with AD/NE and AD/CI and obtain their advice as to the others. Advised both Kent and Sheldon of this.

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13. Chatted with [REDACTED] as to the appropriate cover sheet to be put on the O/O propaganda study. I expressed the view that in putting out this paper O/O was not acting as an office of collection, but was acting as a research office similar to O/CI or O/RR. There were only two points that I felt to be important. First, I concurred in Mr. Reber's view that a statement to the effect that the paper had been prepared for internal CIA use only would be recognized as a subterfuge if the paper were to be distributed outside the Agency. The language proposed by [REDACTED] had avoided this difficulty. Second, it was important to indicate that this was in the form of a working paper and did not bear final CIA evaluation. This need not be done on the cover, but should be indicated before the substance of the paper. [REDACTED] undertook to work out a form for this.

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14. [REDACTED] consulted me as to a proposed deferment of the NSC Senior Staff meeting on Thursday and I indicated that I would gladly defer to the State and Defense view that the meeting should be postponed because necessary action had not as yet been accomplished.

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15. Took the occasion to phone [REDACTED] and compliment him upon the much amplified clipping service we had been receiving from his office. I find it very much minimizes my concern about missing pertinent press items and requested that he inform me if there were any proposal to discontinue this service.

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